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  1.  13
    In Defence of an Indeterminist Theory of Vagueness.John Alexander Burgess - 1998 - The Monist 81 (2):233-252.
    Regardless of the theory of vagueness we adhere to, we all agree that no facts, known or practically knowable, suffice to determine the location of precise boundaries for vague concepts. According to the epistemic theory of vagueness, this ignorance is entirely an epistemic matter—vague concepts have sharp boundaries but we can never know their exact locations. Opposed to epistemicism is a view—or family of views—I shall call indeterminism. The indeterminist agrees with the epistemicist that we lack knowledge of the locations (...)
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  2.  69
    In defense of an indeterminist theory of vagueness.John Alexander Burgess - 1998 - The Monist 81 (1):233--52.
    Regardless of the theory of vagueness we adhere to, we all agree that no facts, known or practically knowable, suffice to determine the location of precise boundaries for vague concepts. According to the epistemic theory of vagueness, this ignorance is entirely an epistemic matter—vague concepts have sharp boundaries but we can never know their exact locations. Opposed to epistemicism is a view—or family of views—I shall call indeterminism. The indeterminist agrees with the epistemicist that we lack knowledge of the locations (...)
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  3.  3
    Vagueness and the Theory of Meaning.John Alexander Burgess - 1981
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